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1. Introduction
It’s sometimes said that (maximising act-) consequentialism is too
demanding.1 Suppose Ann can donate her kidney to save Ben’s life.
Consequentialism suggests that, so long as by donating Ann brings about the
best consequence, she is required to do so. Surely, the sceptics say, morality
can’t be that demanding.
Consequentialists have responded to this objection in various ways. On
the one hand, they insist consequentialism doesn’t in fact demand that much.
Some put forward less demanding versions of consequentialism, such as rule
and satisficing consequentialism.2 Others make the case that pretty much doing
what most people are doing will bring about the best consequence.3 On the other
hand, some consequentialists bite the bullet and accept that morality is indeed
very demanding. Some bolster this response by emphasising the fact that the
demandingness objection is poorly motivated (“why assume that morality isn’t
demanding?”).4 Some point out that the demandingness objection is in tension
with other positions held by non-consequentialists, and therefore nonconsequentialism is incoherent.5 Still, some attempt to explain away the force of
1 Unless otherwise noted, I will use “consequentialism” to mean “maximising actconsequentialism.”
2 Brandt (1959, 1967), Harsanyi (1977), Rawls (1955), and Slote & Pettit (1984).
3 Pettit (1997).
4 Singer (1972).
5 Kagan (1982).
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the demandingness objection with a general scepticism towards intuitions (i.e.,
they “psychologise” intuitions).6
In this paper, I focus on a third type of response, which holds that the
demandingness objection is ill-conceived. In particular, I examine the argument

PREMISE (a). A moral theory is too demanding if it requires Ann
to sacrifice her kidney to save Ben’s life.
PREMISE (b). Consequentialism requires Ann to sacrifice her
kidney to save Ben’s life.
Therefore, consequentialism is too demanding.
Sobel’s argument that the demandingness objection is impotent focuses

put forward by David Sobel in “the Impotence of the Demandingness
7

Objection.” In Section 2, I lay out Sobel’s argument and clarify its force. I then
examine and reject a response to Sobel (Section 3), before defending a different

on PREMISE (a). He notes that in this case, Ben has more to lose than Ann: if a
moral theory doesn’t require Ann to sacrifice her kidney, it would permit Ben to
die. If we focus on the costs to each individual alone, we would have to

response (Section 4 & 5).
I will defend three claims: first, whether the demandingness objection is

conclude that a moral theory that doesn’t require Ann to sacrifice her kidney
would be even more demanding for Ben. This is because the cost to Ben (i.e.,

impotent depends on how “impotence” is interpreted; second, the

life) is higher than that to Ann (i.e., a kidney). Plausibly, it would be

demandingness objection should be understood as an objection that derives its

unacceptable if a moral theory is “too demanding” whether or not it requires

force from a plausible intuition, and so construed, the objection is forceful (I

Ann to sacrifice her kidney. Thus it's also true that if the cost to Ben is higher

will say more about forcefulness and impotence in Section 2); third, we can

than that to Ann, PREMISE (a) must be rejected. A moral theory might not be

justify the intuition, on which the demandingness objection rests, by

too demanding even if it requires Ann to sacrifice her kidney after all.

conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty.

Sobel suggests that to reject this result those who make the
2. What is impotent about the demandingness objection?

demandingness objection need the following distinction:

The demandingness objection to consequentialism can be understood as
DISTINCTION. In assessing how demanding a moral theory is,
what it requires of a helper counts more than what it permits the
aided to bear.

follows.
PREMISE 1. Any plausible moral theory cannot be too
demanding. If a moral theory is too demanding, that give us a
reason to reject it.
PREMISE 2. Consequentialism is too demanding.
CONCLUSION. We have a reason to reject consequentialism.8

In other words, we need to draw a distinction between the costs that a moral
theory requires us to take on (“required costs”) and those that a moral theory
permits to befall us (“costs permitted”). We must hold that the cost to Ann

To make the case for PREMISE 2, one might posit

counts more than the cost to Ben because the former is required by morality

6 Singer (2007).

while the latter is merely permitted.

7 Sobel (2007).

According to Sobel, the problem is that

8 There can be different versions of this objection, depending on how we understand its
force. In the extreme, one could argue the fact that a theory is too demanding is a decisive
reason against the theory. I adopt a more neutral formulation here.

The moral significance of the distinction between costs a moral
theory requires and costs it permits must already be in place
before the Objection gets a grip. But this is for the decisive break
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with Consequentialism to have already happened before we feel
the pull of the Objection9.
The conclusion is not merely that the Objection has as an upshot
that costs required by a moral theory are more demanding than
costs permitted […]. Arguably any argument against
Consequentialism would need to have such an upshot. Rather, the
thought here is that the Objection needs to presuppose the moral
significance of such distinctions as a premise in reaching the
conclusion that Consequentialism is problematically demanding.
The Objection does not help justify such a premise. This is why
we should reject Consequentialism independently of the Objection
or not at all.10

There are also external objections, of which the demandingness objection
is one, that do rely on claims that are not shared by the theory they critique.
Sobel’s argument, then, is that all external objections are impotent. It helps to
illustrate this point with a different external objection. Some people object to
consequentialism with this well-known case, Footbridge: a runaway trolley is
about to kill five people, and you can save these five by pushing aninnocent
person from the footbridge, causing his death.12 Non-consequentialists argue:
PREMISE (a)*. Any plausible moral theory cannot imply that it is
permissible for you to push the person in Footbridge. If a moral
theory does imply this, that gives us a reason to reject the theory.
PREMISE (b)*. Consequentialism implies that it is permissible for
you to push the person in Footbridge.
CONCLUSION. We have a reason to reject consequentialism.

Put it differently: to reach PREMISE (a), we need to presuppose
DISTINCTION, but once we presuppose DISTINCTION, we already
presuppose that consequentialism is false. Therefore, the demandingness
objection, for which PREMISE (a) is needed, is “impotent”, because we should
reject consequentialism independently of it or not at all.

Let us call this the “permissiveness objection” to consequentialism. Now, we
could make a similar charge of “impotence” by pointing out that PREMISE (a)*

Now, we can classify any objection to a theory into two categories. For

relies on

one, there are internal objections – these are objections that do not rely on
further claims rejected by the theory they critique. Here is an example: it’s
argued that there are cases – the so-called “no-difference cases” – where
individual acts, despite being intuitively impermissible, do not seem to make a
difference to the overall consequence; consequentialism, therefore, might
struggle to account for these cases.11 Notice that this objection is made within a
consequentialist framework, as it shares the consequentialist assumption that

DISTINCTION*. To determine whether an individual is permitted
to  to bring about some good at a certain cost, it matters how the
good is brought about (either in terms of the causal relations
between the good and the cost, or whether the agent intends the
cost as a means to the good).13
The reason is that non-consequentialists need to distinguish Footbridge from a
different case, Side Track. In this case, a runaway trolley is about to kill ﬁve
people, and you can save these ﬁve by redirecting the trolley to a different track,

what matters for the permissibility of an act is only its consequences. The
objection here is that, even with this assumption, consequentialism has difficulty
making sense of certain intuitively impermissible acts.

killing another innocent person. Non-consequentialists would hold that any
plausible moral theory must imply that it is permissible for you to redirect the

9 Sobel (2007), p. 3

12 Thomson (1985).

10 Sobel (2007), p 3-4.

13 How to justify DISTINCTION* is a major area of dispute among nonconsequentialists. For two prominent opposing views, see Kamm (2008, chapter 5) and
Tadros (2011, chapter 6&7).

11 See, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), Kagan (2011), Nefsky (2011).
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trolley in Side Track. As such, DISTINCTION is needed to preserve PREMISE
(a)*

(if true) without relying on O though O derives from C.
Now, I think Sobel could be right that if we interpret the charge of “impotence”

PREMISE (a)* requires non-consequentialists to embrace

as INDEPENDENCE, all external objections are impotent. But that is hardly a

DISTINCTION*. One might then argue the permissiveness objection is also

surprising result! By definition, external objections rely on a further claim that,

impotent: in order for the permissiveness objection to get a grip, we must

if justified, is itself sufficient to amount a challenge to the theory.

presuppose DISTINCTION*; but this is for the decisive break with

We should not confuse the charge of “impotence” with lack of force

Consequentialism to have already happened before we feel the pull of the

construed as:

permissiveness objection; as such, we should reject consequentialism

FORCEFULNESS: To say an objection O to a theory T is forceful
is to say that O gives (considerable or sufficient) reason to reject
T.

independently of the permissiveness objection or not at all.
So, if Sobel is right that the demandingness objection – which is often

External objections, such as the demandingness objection and the

used to motivate agent-centred options – is impotent, we should also conclude

permissiveness objection, can have force. These objections derive their force, I

that the permissiveness objection, often used to motivate agent-centred

maintain, from plausible intuitions. The force of the demandingness objection is

constraints, is also impotent. Perhaps, consequentialists should rejoice at this

the thought that, intuitively, it would be too demanding and therefore

implication; perhaps, we should all be consequentialists after all.

unacceptable if Ann is required to sacrifice her kidney. Similarly, the force of the

Now, we should ask what exactly is meant when we say external

permissiveness objection is the thought that, intuitively, it would be

objections are impotent. Sobel seems to have in mind the the view that

unacceptable if you are permitted to push the person in Footbridge. Note that
If a theory T has an implication I, the objection O that I is counterintuitive is impotent just in case O relies on a further claim C
which is incompatible with T.

this doesn’t mean these intuitions do not require further justifications. Nonconsequentialists only need to maintain that their intuitive force is independent

For instance, given that consequentialism (T) implies that Ann is required to

of the force of their justification and that we have some reason to reject

sacrifice her kidney (I), the demandingness objection (O) is impotent because it

consequentialism on this basis even before we offer a justification for the

relies on DISTINCTION* which consequentialists reject. The demandingness

intuition. These intuitions have some force prior to justification.14

objection and the permissiveness objection are impotent because on their own

The crucial point here is that I think Sobel misrepresents the role

they have no force against T though they follow from DISTINCTION and

intuition can play in the demandingness objection. Sobel thinks intuition carries

DISTINCTION* which, if true, would have force against T; we can put this

14 Nor need they claim the intuitions are self-justified. Tedesco ascribes this view to
non-consequentialists and then proceeds to try to refute it (Tedesco (2011)). I don’t think
non-consequentialists need to rest their case on intuitions being self-justified (which is
implausible). They only need to maintain that the intuitive force is independent of the
force of its justification, and we have some reason to reject consequentialism on this basis
even before we offer a justification for the intuition.

point more precisely:
INDEPENDENCE: To say that an objection O to a theory T is
impotent is to say that we could reject T on the basis of claim C
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no weight and it provides no reason to reject a theory, as all the weight is carried

own, is otiose. The demandingness objection and the permissiveness objection

by the idea the agent's costs have precedence over the patient's. Against this I

give us some independent reasons to reject consequentialism – even though we

want to contend powerful intuitions like these carry much weight, they give us

could as well reject consequentialism on the basis of DISTINCTION and

reasons to reject, or suspect, consequentialism for instance, even before we have

DISTINCTION* (if they are justified). The demandingness objection is forceful.

a rationale. In other words, the force of the demandingness objection is derived
from the plausibility of our intuitions.

I’ve argued that regardless of whether the demandingness objection is

We can grasp this point from a different angle. Sometimes, after we have
defended a claim C which, if true, is sufﬁcient for rejecting a theory T, we go on
to argue that a further claim C+ follows from C, and C+ is itself intuitively

impotent, it is forceful. Still, we would want a justification for the intuition that
the objection rests on – namely, we would want to justify the distinction between
required costs and costs permitted. In this section, I look at Fiona Woollard’s

plausible. The reason we do this, I propose, is that we would have more reason
to reject T with C and C+ than with C alone. This is because with C alone, the

proposed justification and explain why it is inadequate.
Woollard’s claim is that only required costs count as moral demands, and

reason we have for rejecting T depends solely the plausibility of our defence for
C, while with C and C+ we have an additional reason, reason derived from the
intuitive plausibility of C+, for rejecting T. So even if we already have a defence
D for the distinction between required costs and costs permitted, it still matters
that it's intuitively implausible that Ann is required to donate her kidney. With

as such, only required costs are relevant to the demandingness objection.16 Her
reasoning is as follows. First, she posits that a moral theory is too demanding
just in case, for the most part, we cannot expect a reasonable agent conform to
the theory.17 By a “reasonable agent”, Woollard has in mind someone who “[lies]
somewhere between saints and sinners”, “[is] not totally self-absorbed”, and

this intuitive claim, the reason for rejecting consequentialism now depends on

“[has] a reasonable concern to act morally.”18 If, in the majority of cases, even a

both the plausibility of D and the plausibility of the intuition.15

reasonable agent cannot be expected to conform to a moral theory, the theory is

Here is the upshot: Sobel is right that in order for PREMISE (a) to be

too demanding.

true, DISTINCTION must be true, but that does not mean that intuition, on its

Woollard then notes that, compared to the costs permitted, required costs

15 It might be said that my argument would justify arbitrary intuitions. If someone has
the intuition that interracial marriage is impermissible, presumably we would not want to
say that intuition gives them a reason to object to interracial marriage. Now I am happy to
grant that having this intuition gives the person some reason to object to interracial
marriage if that intuition meets certain other conditions (for example, if you are a
coherentist, that intuition must cohere with other things that the person believes). Very
often I suspect that people who hold morally objectionable intuitions cannot meet these
conditions. Even if some morally objectionable intuitions survive this ﬁltering process, if
there are other, stronger reasons to reject these intuitions – as there presumably would be
in cases like interracial marriage – then these intuitions should be abandoned. For a
similar point on how we approach morally objectionable intuitions, see Kagan (2016), p.
8. I thank the editor of this journal for the objection.
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16 So, in this sense, Woollard is arguing for a stronger claim than DISTINCTION.
DISTINCTION says that, compared to what a moral theory permits to happen, what the
theory requires counts more towards its moral demands on an agent. Namely, required
costs count more towards moral demands than costs permitted. Woollard, by contrast,
holds that costs permitted do not count as moral demands at all. (Because costs permitted
do not count at all, it is of course true that required costs count more.)
17 Woollard (2016): 96-97. Woollard’s account follows the tradition of many others in a
link between “moral demands” and “what a reasonable agent would do.” See Herman
(1993), Hill (2002), Miller (2004), Noggle (2009), Stohr (2011), and Schmidt (2017).
18 Woollard (2016), p. 96.
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are distinctive because they are costs that “[the agent] has the opportunity to

theory, only the required costs count as moral demands. But we need a

avoid, but only by failing to conform to the relevant moral demand.”19 As such,

justification for the antecedent – we want to know why the demandingness

only required costs give rise to a choice between “accepting the cost and failing

objection should be understood in this way. This is because, if the

to conform to the moral demand.”20 In other words, only when an agent faces

demandingness objection is instead concerned with whether it is reasonable to

required costs does she have to decide whether to conform to a moral theory.

expect someone to accept a moral theory when the theory permits some costs to

That means whether a moral theory is too demanding hangs on whether
we can expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory, and whether we can
expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory hangs on required costs.

befall her, we would get the result that only costs permitted count as moral
demands.
The upshot is this: Woollard correctly identifies what is distinctive about

Therefore, only required costs count as moral demands, and only required costs

required costs – that they are concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect

are relevant to the demandingness objection.

someone to choose to conform to a moral theory; what she fails to do is to

As I see it, the problem of Woollard’s analysis is this: she assumes

justify why we should focus on what is distinctive about required costs instead

without argument that whether a moral theory is too demanding hangs on

of, say, what is distinctive about costs permitted. Woollard’s analysis relies on

whether we can expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory. She says,

privileging the perspective of the moral agents at the expense of moral patients,
in that we must treat only what’s distinctive about the moral agents as relevant to

An underlying concern of the demandingness objection is the
worry that some theories or principles ask so much of the agent
that it is not reasonable to expect an agent to choose to conform to
the moral principle. Behind this lies the thought that morality
should be such that it is generally reasonable to expect an agent to
choose to conform to it.21

moral demands, as opposed to what’s distinctive about the moral patients (faced
with a choice regarding whether to accept the moral theory). As such, Woollard’s
justification for DISTINCTION is inadequate.
4. Moral demands as difficulty

One might ask: why should the demandingness objection be concerned
with whether it is reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral

In Section 3, I identified the problem with Woollard’s justification for
DISTINCTION.22 In this section, I make the case that we can justify

theory? More specifically, one might instead posit that the demandingness
objection should be concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect someone

DISTINCTION by conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty.
Here is the central claim: a moral theory is too demanding just in case it

to accept a moral theory when the theory permits some costs to befall her. In

requires the agent to do things (or to refrain from doing things) that are

other words, it is true that if the demandingness objection is concerned with

unreasonably difficult to do (to refrain from doing).23 The difficulty I have in

whether it is reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral
20 Ibid.

22 In fact, I suspect that so long as we conceptualise moral demands as costs, we will
struggle justify DISTINCTION without begging the question (though I do not have an
argument for this stronger claim).

21 Ibid.

23 McElwee (2015, 2016), Chappell (2019), Lippert-Rasmussen (2019).

19 Woollard (2016), p. 94.
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mind here is motivational difficulty, which in turn can be analysed as the

someone to donate her kidney if doing so is unreasonably difficult (“ought

likelihood of success conditional on trying. Roughly, the difficulty of -ing is

implies can will”).26
I concede that, to justify my claim that an agent is not required to  if -

measured by how likely it is that an agent succeeds in -ing if she tries (and
does not give up trying) to . i-ing is more motivationally difficult than j-ing

ing is unreasonably difficult, a lot more needs to be said. I will restrict myself to

just in case, if the agent tries (and does not give up trying) to i and to j , she is

making one further remark. I pointed out that Woollard’s analysis relies on

24

assuming that the demandingness objection is concerned with whether it is

more likely to succeed in i -ing.

reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral theory. This is

Conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty helps justify

problematic because one might similarly posit the demandingness objection as

the distinction between required costs and costs permitted. The question of
motivational difficulty only arises when a moral theory requires an agent to do
something at a certain cost. In other words, required costs are related to

being concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect someone to accept a
moral theory when the theory permits some costs to befall her. The latter
construal would get us the result that only costs permitted count as moral

motivational difficulty in a way that costs permitted are not: the higher the

demands.

required costs of -ing, the more motivational difficulty it is to . For this

Now, notice that a similar objection cannot be made against my

reason, only required costs are relevant to moral demands.25

argument. My claim is that the demandingness objection is concerned with

Now, one might raise an objection, similar to the one I raised against

whether doing something at a certain cost is unreasonably difficult, and I said

Woollard’s analysis: why should we think that the demandingness objection is

that we should justify this with reference to the limitations on human

concerned with motivational difficulty? Am I not also assuming what needs to

motivational capacity. Here, an objector might posit instead that the

be argued for?

demandingness objection should be concerned with whether it would be

I think we can offer a rationale for why the demandingness objection
should be concerned with motivational difficulty. Any plausible moral theory, it
seems, must recognise the limitations on human motivational capacity. The

unreasonably difficult for someone to accept that morality permits a cost to
befall her.
My response is two-fold. In one sense, there is no fact of the matter as to

underlying point is that morality is for beings like us – beings whose

whether it would be unreasonably difficult for someone to accept that morality

motivational capacity is limited. Just as it would be unreasonable to require

permits a cost to befall her – there is no question as to whether it would be

someone to rescue a drowning child from a dangerous swimming pool if she

unreasonably difficult for Ben to accept that morality permits Ann not to save

cannot swim (“ought implies can”), it would be unreasonable to require

him. This is because morality doesn’t ask Ben to do anything.

24 This analysis of motivational difficulty is borrowed from Southwood (2016).

However, there is another sense in which the question of unreasonable

25 I say “only required costs are relevant to moral demands” instead of “only required
costs count as moral demands” because, under my conception, it is motivational
difficulty that counts as moral demands.

26 Cf. Estlund (2011).
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difficulty does arise. Although morality doesn’t ask Ben to do anything, it does

not problematically beg the question. For one, we can justify why the

presumably ask Ben to refrain from taking Ann’s kidney. So, there is indeed a

demandingness objection should be concerned with motivational difficulty. I

question as to whether, for Ben, refraining from taking Ann’s kidney is

pointed out that, plausibly, morality should recognise the limitations on human

unreasonably difficult – if it is, then although Ann is not required to sacrifice her

motivational capacity. For another, my analysis does not privilege the

kidney voluntarily, Ben is not required to refrain from taking it either and he is

perspective of the moral agents over that of the moral patients. In one sense, a

therefore permitted to impose the cost on Ann.

moral theory doesn’t ask the moral patients to do anything, so there is no

Now, I think this is a very interesting (if somewhat surprising)

question as to whether accepting the theory is unreasonably difficult. In another

implication. I do not know if refraining from taking someone else’s kidney when

sense, a moral theory does ask the moral patients to refrain from doing

one is dying is indeed unreasonably difficult; I do not want to take a stand on

something, which might as well be unreasonably difficult.29 My account allows

this point. Nevertheless, there are more clear-cut cases. Suppose, as I think is

us to accommodate this: if refraining from doing something is unreasonably

plausible, that it would be unreasonably difficult for wealthy citizens in

difficult, an individual is not required to do so.

developed countries to donate a large portion of their income to charities,

5. Clarifications

especially when very few others are doing the same.27 My account then suggests
that these wealthy citizens are not required to donate a large sum of their money
voluntarily. But, as is also plausible, if it would be unreasonably difficult for

I’ve argued that conceptualising moral demands as motivational
difficulty helps justify the demandingness objection. In this section, I make two
further clarifications.

those in dire need to refrain from taking the resources from these wealthy

Sobel briefly discusses and dismisses the idea that we should

citizens, refraining from taking the resources from these wealthy individuals is

conceptualise moral demands as motivational difficulty. He says,

also not required. Therefore, although wealthy citizens in developed countries
might not be required to donate, it would be permissible for those in dire needs
28

to forcibly take their money away.

In sum, unlike Woollard’s argument, the account that I develop here does
27 Cf. MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord (2018).

[A] significant reason it is difficult to comply with a morality that
requires large costs of us as agents is that we assume such a moral
theory will result in a situation that is much worse for us, our
loved ones, or our projects. But this needs not be so. For we might
be asked to bear large costs as agents yet receive large benefits as
patients. Depending on the size and kind of benefits, it would be

28 Of course, it’s not the case it would be unreasonably difficult for wealthy citizens in
developed countries to donate any amount of money, and as such, donating a certain
amount voluntarily is still required. In addition, it is not always permissible for those in
dire needs to forcibly take money from the wealthy, even when refraining from doing so
is unreasonably difficult. Plausibly, the means employed must beproportional, and if
forcibly taking resources from the wealthy infringes on other rights of theirs (such as the
right to physical safety), that is something which counts against doing it. For further
discussion see Nagel (1975) p. 145.

29 Here though, it might be said that “moral patients” in one context are just as “moral
agents” in another context. So, regarding whether it would be unreasonably difficult for
Ben to accept that morality permits Ann not to sacrifice her kidney, Ben is a moral
patient; regarding whether it would be unreasonably difficult for Ben to refrain from
taking Ann’s kidney, Ben is a moral agent. That’s why there is no conflict between saying
that in one sense, the question of motivational difficulty doesn’t arise for Ben, while in
another sense, the question does arise.
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odd to call such a moral theory excessively demanding.30
The thought is that, plausibly, we would all fare better under consequentialism –
although we would be asked to make (significant) sacrifices more often, we
would also be recipients of (significant) benefits more often. If we all fare better
under consequentialism, it then seems odd to object to consequentialism as
being too demanding.31 The underlying point is this: we often find doing certain
things difficult because we are mistaken about how we will be impacted; if only
we could remember consequentialism will make us all better off, we would not
find making large sacrifices difficult.

weight training but, due to the commitment of helping, it seems
that he will miss one training session in the gym. But Jim has
many boxes filled with books so that Josh will be able to have a
proper training session and profit from the consequences of
exercising while helping his friend. The action will have extra
non-moral value.
Now, what if Josh all of a sudden finds it difficult to motivate
himself to do the extra training in the form of lifting Jim’s boxes
although he will enjoy this exercise, and he also realizes the good
long-term consequences. But does it make sense to say that this
difficulty increases the demandingness of the moral obligation to
help his friend?33
The last rhetorical question is meant to illustrate that only costs, and not

This objection, however, neglects the fact that motivating ourselves to do
certain things can be difficult, even when we know that these things are
beneficial to us.32 I might know that eating healthy is beneficial, but that hardly
means sticking to a healthy diet cannot be motivationally difficult. It’s true that
reminding ourselves of the benefits we will receive often makes is easier to do
certain things, but we should not overstate this point. It is plausible that donating
one’s kidney to save a stranger is very difficult – perhaps unreasonably so – no
matter how many times we are gently reminded we will all be better off in the

difficulty, count as moral demands – even if Josh “all of a sudden finds it
difficult to motivate himself”, this doesn’t seem to make what morality asks him
to do more demanding.
Now, notice my claim that one is not required to  if -ing is
unreasonably difficult – what matters is not just how difficult one in fact findsing to be; there is also a reasonableness constraint. That is to say, Josh might in
fact all of a sudden find helping his friend difficult, but plausibly that would not
be reasonable. More generally, I think van Ackeren’s analysis reveals a

long term.
Unlike Sobel, Marcel van Ackeren recognises that doing beneficial things
can be difficult, and yet, he maintains that we should not conceptualise moral

(common) misunderstanding of what it means to conceptualise moral demands
as motivational difficulty. The suggestion I am making is not that we should
understand the demandingness of -ing is in terms of, as a matter of fact, the

demands as motivational difficulty. He writes,

motivational difficulty for a particular agent to . Instead, the claim is that the
Suppose that Josh is morally required to help Jim move to another
town – let us say because Jim has already helped Josh move and
also because they are good friends. Suppose Josh likes to do

demandingness of -ing should be understood as how motivationally difficult ing would be for a reasonable agent – agent who shares a reasonable concern for
the well-being of others.34 That is to say, if even a reasonable agent would find

30 Sobel (2007), p. 10.

-ing sufficiently difficult, -ing is not required. If, on the other hand, a

31 The argument that most people will fare better is often used as an argument for
accepting consequentialism. See Harsanyi (1955, 1977). See also, Hare (2013, 2016).
32 Van Ackeren (2018): 319-20.
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particular agent in fact finds -ing sufficiently difficult due to some

I would like to thank Seth Lazar and Christian Barry for their written comments

unreasonable idiosyncrasies, -ing is required all the same.

on an early draft of this paper. I also thank the editor of this journal for helpful

To illustrate this point, imagine a variation of van Ackeren’s case. Suppose

discussion and comments.

the reason Josh “all of a sudden finds it difficult to motivate himself” is that he
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